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This is a translation of an interview with Christianne Fando published by the Spanish daily El Mundo on November 9, 1998. Fando is a Basque lawyer who advised ETA during the failed talks in Algeria between ETA and the Spanish government in 1987. She talks about the ETA-Spain contacts in Algeria and compares it to the so-called "process" after ETA declared an indefinite truce in September 1998 and the Basque nationalist accord of Lizarra-Garazi. Fando, from Navarre's territories under French administration, has represented many Basque political prisoners and refugees. Her investigation of the crimes by the Spanish government's GAL death squads in the mid-1980s against Basque militants was crucial to the discovery that Spain had organized, directed and funded them.
Note: translator's notes in brackets.
Christianne Fando / A lawyer of the Basque political prisoners
"If the aspirations of the Basque people are frustrated, another ETA could go back to armed struggle."
Manuel Cerdan
Antonio Rubio
Question: What is the difference between this process and the one in Algeria?
Answer: Many. In Algeria, when the first contacts were initiated, ETA had not decided to call an indefinite cease-fire. Besides, it was ETA who was leading and the one who had direct contacts with the Spanish government. It seems this is not the case now. The political parties played no role in Algeria. The model then was the KAS alternative; today the framework is much wider. ETA leaves in the hands of the political parties the responsibility to create a new political framework to encompass the entire Basque Country. It seems to me that the context and the interlocutors are different, and that the framework is wider.
Q: What was negotiated in Algeria that would be useful today?
A: In Algeria nothing was negotiated in the end. What was done was to raise several issues and to share ideas but the contacts were broken. A process of pacification requires courage, imagination and political will which was missing then. ETA has now come up with a new proposal that has caught many by surprise. It has been said for many years that peace in the Basque Country could not be achieved because ETA existed. Now ETA has the ball on the government's roof. It remains to be seen what the so-called democrats will do.
Q: Aznar has said he's willing to negotiate with ETA...
A: I'm glad he said the Spanish government is going to negotiate with ETA. But I hope they will go deeper and make a clear policy that would allow the demands of the Basque people be taken into consideration.
Q: What is ETA going to demand at the negotiating table?
A: More than anything to look for a political framework that would recognize the situation in the Basque Country, and also the release of the prisoners.
Q: Who would be the interlocutors?
A: I don't think the names are so important.
Q: What is left of the ETA of Algeria, and of Txomin?
A: I don't like to talk about the ETA of then and now. ETA exists. There have been demands marked by different political situations. Txomin [Domingo Iturbe Abasolo] had a key role in ETA, but he was not the only one. He was the one who defended dialogue with the Spanish government and, today, other [ETA] militants are doing the same but with great differences. The time of Txomin and of the militants of 10 years ago is very different from the one today. Now we are talking about Europe and Euskadi [another name for Euskal Herria], Madrid or Paris.
Q: You participated in the negotiations between ETA and [Spain's chief of security] Vera in Algeria. What did you think when you saw him in the Guadalajara prison together with [former minister of interior] Barrionuevo?
A: It's a paradox. Most of the Spanish government officials I met with in Algeria are in prison or have been prosecuted. It's funny. A general amnesty was proposed in Algeria. During the first meetings in 1987, ETA told the government spokesmen that a general amnesty would also benefit the chiefs of GAL [death squads organized, directed and financed by Spain's ministry of interior]. What we didn't know was that the spokesmen in Algeria would be in jail today and could have benefitted from a hypothetical amnesty.
Q: Did you talk about exchanging ETA prisoners for GAL prisoners?
A: Yes. The amnesty of ETA and GAL prisoners was pacted. That was discussed in five minutes and they (the government spokesmen) accepted immediately. The Spanish government did not oppose. We said that we all had something to win.
Q: That is, Vera, Sancristobal, Argote or Elgorriaga took note of that.
A: They didn't have to do it. We went into another subject saying that issue was resolved.
Q: What happened with the other interlocutors and ETA leaders like Josu Ternera, Urrusolo, Pakito, Antxon..? Do they still have some weight?
A: They are part of the [ETA] collective of prisoners.
Q: Does still hurt you when you remember that ETA called you, and I_aki Esnaola, the "cancer annihilator"?
A: It hurt when they said it. I think I got over that. I was lucky to have my family and true friends on my side. It's a pity that the ideas I defended, along with other people, were killed without given the opportunity to debate them. It is always difficult to understand a conviction without a trial. Time goes by and things change. At least I can say that I have been faithful to my ideas and that I'm independent. I'm glad to see new roads are openning to the search for solutions.
Q: Do you think the cease-fire is definitive?
A: I think so. Anyone who reads the ETA communique has to think that if ETA issued that communique, [ETA] is serious, and that it has taken a very clear stance by leaving the [search] for solutions in the hands of the political parties.
Q: Were you surprised when ETA issued that communique?
A: I have waited many years for that communique or a similar one. Only the timing surprised me. It is a proposal similar to one made many years ago, although the events since 1990 have propitiated a much clear situation.
Q: Was the old ETA cupola informed of what was being cooked?
A: I never liked to speak of an ETA cupola and much less when its leadership is in jail. From my own experience, the history of ETA shows that its leaders, whether they were the number one, are just another prisoner when they are in jail. I hope that the ETA militants were consulted before [ETA] made that decision.
Q: ETA was the leading voice in Algeria. Who is leading now, ETA or EH [Euskal Herritarrok]?
A: I think ETA has left in the hands of EH and other political parties the leading voice. It has let EH and the nationalist parties make nationalist politics. ETA has remained in the background right from the start.
Q: Interior hints ETA declared a truce becaue it was cornered. Do you agree?
A: From my own experience of more than 20 years dealing with these issues, I have heard many times that ETA was cornered and had no future. Every time ETA declared a truce it has done it by its own free will.
Q: But you couldn't deny ETA has less capacity than before...
A: If ETA has been able to survive so many years, despite police action, it can also do it now. It still has people willing to work and popular support. The problem is to know what is that it wants to do. ETA still is able to carry out attacks and do a lot of harm because it has economic autonomy to maintain commandos willing to act. ETA has only told us that stopped and nothing more.
Q: Did the electoral results surprise you?
A: No. If we analyse the results of the elections in which HB - now EH - has participated we arrive to the conclusion that, every time we have talked about negotiation or channels of solution, the coalition has obtained good results. There was a sector of the population in Euskadi that, although it supported the political goals of ETA, it could have disagreed with the means used and opposed certain attacks. This people now has come forward and given their vote. I was surprised by the results of the [ruling] Popular Party which won a lot. We should ask ourselves why [the PP] has risen so much and if the [ETA] attacks on its councillors helped that.
Q: When you speak about certain attacks, are you referring to the attack on Miguel Angel Blanco?
A: Yes, I'm referring to the attacks on the PP councillors. Lately there was a sector of the population that had difficulties understanding this kind of attack but was in favor of seeking political ways to [solve] the conflict.
Q: What do you think of the role of Otegi and Iruin in the negotiations?
A: I don't the information to make a statement. It is true that since a new type of people appeared in HB and EH, the plan changed. About Iruin I can only say that when Esnaola proposed that type of way out in 1990, he did not defend it.
Q: Would it be positive if EH forms a government with the PNV?
A: It would be difficult to move forward the agreements of Lizarra outside the [regional] government. The issues would have to be discussed in the Basque parliament in order to reach crucial agreements with the {"moderate" Basque nationalists] PNV and EA.
Q: Is ETA preparing a meeting?
A: The ETA assemblies are history now. Wouldn't you think that if [ETA] had to have an assembly meeting it would not have done it before announcing the truce?
Q: Is there a soft and hardline sector within ETA?
A: I think that is another exageration of the press. A different analysis or plan could exist at a particular moment but when it had to speak, ETA has done it with only one voice.
Q: Who is charge in ETA?
A: ETA is in charge.
Q: What had priority during former negotiations, a police strategy or a political solution?
A: In Algeria we spoke of a political solution. The lack of trust was the problem. If there is a sector within the government that thinks a police strategy will be a solution, they are wrong. I hope that the top officials in the Spanish government, whether in the right or the left, realize that a police strategy doesn't get anywhere.
Q: ETA, in the end, is going to give up armed struggle with a center-right [Spanish] government...
A: It is possible that a solution may come with a right-wing government, but let's not forget that we're only at the starting. It is important to reach a solution. Personally, I would have liked [a solution] to come with the left.
Q: Would ETA go back to armed struggle if no agreement is reached with the government?
A: If the wishes of the Basque people are once again frustrated, it is possible that with time another ETA could emerge.
Q: Do you think that like in the Pinochet case, the families of the victims of GAL in France could act against Felipe Gonzalez?
A: I don't trust the French politicians. They always refused to investigate the authorities and politicians in this country who collaborated with GAL. The political will to cover it up prevailed. The only cases moving forward are those cases opened in the Spanish state. An investigation could be initiated only if an Spanish official denounces to the National Court that he paid French policemen for information about ETA. Otherwise I don't see how an investigation could move forward.
Q: Was there a pact between the French and the Spanish governments to cover up GAL?
A: Yes. If we know something about it in Spain, it's because they did a poor job and thought they would not be punished; and second, because some journalists dared to raised the issue.
The French cannot investigate Gonzalez because government officials and politicians in this country could be linked to GAL, and they are not interested in that. If they didn't do it when the Basque Country was in shock, they are not going to do it now either. France never wanted to investigate the dirty war. We already said the Spanish government was behind it and they called us liars. If it was clear to me, it was clear to the French government too.
Q: Is more evidence needed?
A: It would be the only way to move it forward. In France, when people has been prosecuted for defamation of top government officials linked to GAL, the latter always won the case. The French justice did not authorize any investigation to find out if the accusations were mere lucubrations or were based on real facts.