Britain as a claimed neutral power.
In November 1990 the then Secretary Of State Peter Brooke told his constituency party that the British government had ‘no selfish, strategic or economic reasons for remaining in Northern Ireland’. Much has been made of this statement not least by those very few republican leaders who had been engaged in prolonged and secret contacts with British establishment figures. For them the statement was an opportunity to bring selective segments of those contacts into the public domain and to publicly launch what became known as the ‘peace process’. For more discerning republicans the statement was a classic British ruse to outflank those republican leaders into accepting that British occupation was not the problem but that unionist objection to Irish unity was. The British had protected their occupation by deflecting republican attention onto the issue of unionist consent whilst the British maneuvered themselves into the guise of neutral protector of that consent. The Dublin government readily accepted this British deception as it removed the onus from them of having to confront London over the issue of Irish unity. The GFA and the subsequent St Andrews Agreement are equally built upon this deception.
The 32CSM’s objections to this perceived role for the British government lay in the simple observation that no government claiming sovereignty over a region in conflict could claim neutrality in that conflict. It was not the privilege of the British government to exonerate itself of the implications of its occupation and at the same time demand Irish recognition for the legitimacy of this occupation. Equally it is not the privilege of the British government to devolve certain policing powers whilst retaining control over ‘security matters’ which can give effective direction to such policing. Alas Irish constitutional nationalism allowed, and is allowing, this very scenario to unfold and take root. Even in accepting this British deception the nefarious history of British involvement in policing in Ireland renders it as a totally unacceptable agency to retain authority or influence over any aspect of policing and justice in Ireland. It is for those who support this contention of British neutrality to explain, against the backdrop of British criminality in Ireland via policing structures, that Britain is an acceptable agency in this matter. The 32CSM suggests that no such explanation is possible.
The following list of Official Enquiries, findings, and source material is a potent advocacy against British involvement in policing matters of any kind in Ireland.
Inquiry Reports
Barron, Henry. (2003). The Report of the Independent Commission of Inquiry into the Dublin and Monaghan Bombings, (Presented to an Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern, on 29 October 2003; Published 10 December 2003
Cory Collusion Inquiry Reports
Cory, Peter. (2003b). Cory Collusion Inquiry Report: Patrick Finucane <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/collusion/cory/cory03finucane.pdf>, (Delivered 7 October 2003; Published 1 April 2004),
Cory, Peter. (2003d). Cory Collusion Inquiry Report: Robert Hamill <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/collusion/cory/cory03hamill.pdf>, (Delivered 7 October 2003; Published 1 April 2004
Cory, Peter. (2003e). Cory Collusion Inquiry Report: Rosemary Nelson <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/collusion/cory/cory03nelson.pdf>, (Delivered 7 October 2003; Published 1 April 2004),
See also:
Murphy, Paul. (2004). Statement by Paul Murphy, then Secretary of State, on the Government's Response to the Cory Reports, (1 April 2004
Stevens, John (2003). Stevens Enquiry: Overview and Recommendations <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/collusion/stevens3/stevens3summary.htm>, 17 April 2003. By Sir John Stevens QPM, DL Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service
Other Reports
British Irish Rights Watch. (1999). Deadly Intelligence: State involvement in Loyalist murder in Northern Ireland <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/violence/birw0299.htm>, (Summary). London: British Irish Rights Watch.
British Military Intelligence. (1973). Subversion in the UDR <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/publicrecords/1973/subversion_in_the_udr.htm> (Ulster Defence Regiment), (August 1973). London: Public Record Office
Cassel, Douglass., Kemp, Susie., Pigou, Piers., and Sawyer, Stephen. (2006).
Report of the Independent International Panel on Alleged Collusion in Sectarian Killings in Northern Ireland, (dated October 2006), (published 6 November 2006),
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights. (2002). Beyond Collusion: The UK Security Forces and the Murder of Pat Finucane, (12 February 2002), Washington: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights.
Books
Bruce, Steve. (1992). The Red Hand: Protestant Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/violence/bruce.htm>. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Murray, Raymond. (1998). Extracts from: State Violence: Northern Ireland 1969-1997 <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/violence/murray.htm>. Cork: Mercier Press.
McKittrick, David, Kelters, Seamus, Feeney, Brian and Thornton, Chris. (1999). Lost Lives: the stories of the men, women and children who died as a result of the Northern Ireland troubles <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/violence/mckittrick.htm>. Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing Company.
Ní Aoláin, Fionnuala. (2000). The Politics Of Force: Conflict Management and State Violence in Northern Ireland <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/violence/docs/niaolain/niaolain00.htm>. Belfast: Blackstaff Press.
Rolston, Bill. (2000). 'Shoot to Kill' <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/violence/docs/rolston00.htm> from: Unfinished Business: State Killings and the Quest for Truth. Belfast: Beyond the Pale.
Sutton, Malcolm. (1994). An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland 1969-1993. Belfast: Beyond the Pale. [See also the revised and updated Sutton Index of Deaths <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/index.html>.]
The above material covers the entire recent period of the Anglo-Irish conflict and is indicative of British policing in Ireland. The depth of criminality as demonstrated here clearly points to the complete removal of British influence over any aspect of policing in Ireland. Equally republicans must demand off the Irish government, on the back of the Barron Report confirming British involvement in the Dublin and Monaghan bombings, that it refuses to support or enter into any formal arrangement on policing with a government who killed Irish citizens on that government’s soil. The perennial unsuitability of the British government concerning policing is as valid an argument as the constitutional objection, and in tandem with the political context of occupation, the 32CSM submit that all three should form the basis of republican strategies opposing the current trend.
The Third Option
As recognised from the outset policing is a social necessity. In light of republican objections to British policing in Ireland, in tandem with republican inability to provide adequate policing, the 32CSM proposes a third option which can satisfy both the legitimacy of republican objections whilst satisfying the social necessity. The 32CSM calls for the deployment of an international policing force as an interim policing arrangement pending a resolution of the constitutional conflict. We submit that from the republican perspective the deployment of such a force would satisfy the political reality republicans face without prejudice to the validity of our position. We equally submit that the observations laid out in this document afford republicans a powerful case to argue for the deployment of such a force. The deployment of such a force, as an interim arrangement, would de facto constitute the following:
·A resolution of the social necessity.
·A recognition that a dispute over the sovereignty of the Six Counties exists.
·A significant diminution of British sovereignty.
·The removal of policing and the abuse of police powers to maintain partition.
·That there are alternative arrangements to the current proposals.
·A necessity to commence negotiations on the issue of sovereignty.
·A salient issue for republican unity.
The 32CSM remains of the firm conviction that a Democratic Forum on Policing is the best vehicle for republicans to not only articulate our strategic positions but to maximise their practical advancement. We believe that such an approach is the best way forward for our overall goal. In this document we have endeavoured to give a comprehensive assessment on the policing issue and how it relates to the conflict in general. We have striven to address in practical terms the principle political perspectives that currently exist on the policing issue and have offered republicans practical counter-arguments to them. Coupled with these arguments the 32CSM has outlined a series of activities that republicans can engage in to promote these arguments. At no point have we made the adoption of either the arguments or activities conditional in any way other than the understanding that the policing issue cannot be detached from the constitutional question. We reiterate that the contents of this document are for the benefit of republicanism and not the 32 County Sovereignty Movement. We look forward to republican engagement.
In November 1990 the then Secretary Of State Peter Brooke told his constituency party that the British government had ‘no selfish, strategic or economic reasons for remaining in Northern Ireland’. Much has been made of this statement not least by those very few republican leaders who had been engaged in prolonged and secret contacts with British establishment figures. For them the statement was an opportunity to bring selective segments of those contacts into the public domain and to publicly launch what became known as the ‘peace process’. For more discerning republicans the statement was a classic British ruse to outflank those republican leaders into accepting that British occupation was not the problem but that unionist objection to Irish unity was. The British had protected their occupation by deflecting republican attention onto the issue of unionist consent whilst the British maneuvered themselves into the guise of neutral protector of that consent. The Dublin government readily accepted this British deception as it removed the onus from them of having to confront London over the issue of Irish unity. The GFA and the subsequent St Andrews Agreement are equally built upon this deception.
The 32CSM’s objections to this perceived role for the British government lay in the simple observation that no government claiming sovereignty over a region in conflict could claim neutrality in that conflict. It was not the privilege of the British government to exonerate itself of the implications of its occupation and at the same time demand Irish recognition for the legitimacy of this occupation. Equally it is not the privilege of the British government to devolve certain policing powers whilst retaining control over ‘security matters’ which can give effective direction to such policing. Alas Irish constitutional nationalism allowed, and is allowing, this very scenario to unfold and take root. Even in accepting this British deception the nefarious history of British involvement in policing in Ireland renders it as a totally unacceptable agency to retain authority or influence over any aspect of policing and justice in Ireland. It is for those who support this contention of British neutrality to explain, against the backdrop of British criminality in Ireland via policing structures, that Britain is an acceptable agency in this matter. The 32CSM suggests that no such explanation is possible.
The following list of Official Enquiries, findings, and source material is a potent advocacy against British involvement in policing matters of any kind in Ireland.
Inquiry Reports
Barron, Henry. (2003). The Report of the Independent Commission of Inquiry into the Dublin and Monaghan Bombings, (Presented to an Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern, on 29 October 2003; Published 10 December 2003
Cory Collusion Inquiry Reports
Cory, Peter. (2003b). Cory Collusion Inquiry Report: Patrick Finucane <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/collusion/cory/cory03finucane.pdf>, (Delivered 7 October 2003; Published 1 April 2004),
Cory, Peter. (2003d). Cory Collusion Inquiry Report: Robert Hamill <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/collusion/cory/cory03hamill.pdf>, (Delivered 7 October 2003; Published 1 April 2004
Cory, Peter. (2003e). Cory Collusion Inquiry Report: Rosemary Nelson <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/collusion/cory/cory03nelson.pdf>, (Delivered 7 October 2003; Published 1 April 2004),
See also:
Murphy, Paul. (2004). Statement by Paul Murphy, then Secretary of State, on the Government's Response to the Cory Reports, (1 April 2004
Stevens, John (2003). Stevens Enquiry: Overview and Recommendations <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/collusion/stevens3/stevens3summary.htm>, 17 April 2003. By Sir John Stevens QPM, DL Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police Service
Other Reports
British Irish Rights Watch. (1999). Deadly Intelligence: State involvement in Loyalist murder in Northern Ireland <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/violence/birw0299.htm>, (Summary). London: British Irish Rights Watch.
British Military Intelligence. (1973). Subversion in the UDR <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/publicrecords/1973/subversion_in_the_udr.htm> (Ulster Defence Regiment), (August 1973). London: Public Record Office
Cassel, Douglass., Kemp, Susie., Pigou, Piers., and Sawyer, Stephen. (2006).
Report of the Independent International Panel on Alleged Collusion in Sectarian Killings in Northern Ireland, (dated October 2006), (published 6 November 2006),
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights. (2002). Beyond Collusion: The UK Security Forces and the Murder of Pat Finucane, (12 February 2002), Washington: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights.
Books
Bruce, Steve. (1992). The Red Hand: Protestant Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/violence/bruce.htm>. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Murray, Raymond. (1998). Extracts from: State Violence: Northern Ireland 1969-1997 <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/violence/murray.htm>. Cork: Mercier Press.
McKittrick, David, Kelters, Seamus, Feeney, Brian and Thornton, Chris. (1999). Lost Lives: the stories of the men, women and children who died as a result of the Northern Ireland troubles <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/violence/mckittrick.htm>. Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing Company.
Ní Aoláin, Fionnuala. (2000). The Politics Of Force: Conflict Management and State Violence in Northern Ireland <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/violence/docs/niaolain/niaolain00.htm>. Belfast: Blackstaff Press.
Rolston, Bill. (2000). 'Shoot to Kill' <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/issues/violence/docs/rolston00.htm> from: Unfinished Business: State Killings and the Quest for Truth. Belfast: Beyond the Pale.
Sutton, Malcolm. (1994). An Index of Deaths from the Conflict in Ireland 1969-1993. Belfast: Beyond the Pale. [See also the revised and updated Sutton Index of Deaths <http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/sutton/index.html>.]
The above material covers the entire recent period of the Anglo-Irish conflict and is indicative of British policing in Ireland. The depth of criminality as demonstrated here clearly points to the complete removal of British influence over any aspect of policing in Ireland. Equally republicans must demand off the Irish government, on the back of the Barron Report confirming British involvement in the Dublin and Monaghan bombings, that it refuses to support or enter into any formal arrangement on policing with a government who killed Irish citizens on that government’s soil. The perennial unsuitability of the British government concerning policing is as valid an argument as the constitutional objection, and in tandem with the political context of occupation, the 32CSM submit that all three should form the basis of republican strategies opposing the current trend.
The Third Option
As recognised from the outset policing is a social necessity. In light of republican objections to British policing in Ireland, in tandem with republican inability to provide adequate policing, the 32CSM proposes a third option which can satisfy both the legitimacy of republican objections whilst satisfying the social necessity. The 32CSM calls for the deployment of an international policing force as an interim policing arrangement pending a resolution of the constitutional conflict. We submit that from the republican perspective the deployment of such a force would satisfy the political reality republicans face without prejudice to the validity of our position. We equally submit that the observations laid out in this document afford republicans a powerful case to argue for the deployment of such a force. The deployment of such a force, as an interim arrangement, would de facto constitute the following:
·A resolution of the social necessity.
·A recognition that a dispute over the sovereignty of the Six Counties exists.
·A significant diminution of British sovereignty.
·The removal of policing and the abuse of police powers to maintain partition.
·That there are alternative arrangements to the current proposals.
·A necessity to commence negotiations on the issue of sovereignty.
·A salient issue for republican unity.
The 32CSM remains of the firm conviction that a Democratic Forum on Policing is the best vehicle for republicans to not only articulate our strategic positions but to maximise their practical advancement. We believe that such an approach is the best way forward for our overall goal. In this document we have endeavoured to give a comprehensive assessment on the policing issue and how it relates to the conflict in general. We have striven to address in practical terms the principle political perspectives that currently exist on the policing issue and have offered republicans practical counter-arguments to them. Coupled with these arguments the 32CSM has outlined a series of activities that republicans can engage in to promote these arguments. At no point have we made the adoption of either the arguments or activities conditional in any way other than the understanding that the policing issue cannot be detached from the constitutional question. We reiterate that the contents of this document are for the benefit of republicanism and not the 32 County Sovereignty Movement. We look forward to republican engagement.
32
In addition to petitioning Human Rights organizations the 32CSM proposes that the Democratic Forum on Policing be charged with forging international co-operation with other revolutionary groups who have faced, or could face, a similar scenario to both augment our own strategies from their experiences, and, in turn, provide a framework from which other struggles can reference the effectiveness of our efforts. It is incumbent on republicans to fully understand the implications of our terminology and the political necessity of pursuing them in the theatres where such matters are addressed. British Occupation is not a slogan but a political statement which republicans need to demonstrate the veracity of if certain strategies are to be made available to us to end it.
>